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Abstract 
We assess the correlations between tribalism and financial development in 123 
countries using data averages from 2000-2010. The tribalism index is used to 
measure tribalism whereas financial development is measured from perspectives 
of financial intermediary and stock market developments.  The long-term variable 
is stock market capitalisation while short-run indicators include: private and 
domestic credits. We find that tribalism is negatively correlated with financial 
development and the magnitude of negativity is higher for financial intermediary 
development relative to stock market development. The findings are particularly 
relevant to African and Middle Eastern countries where the scourge is most 
pronounced.  
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1. Introduction 
Much work has been devoted to assessing the relationship between financial 
development and economic development (Levine, 1997, 2005; Ang, 2008). To 
this end, many angles have been explored over the past decades, notably: the role 
of the State (Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Ang, 2013a; Becerra et al., 2012); law and 
finance theory (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Beck et al., 2003); power and 
information credit-oriented theories (Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Djankow et al., 
2007; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981); endowment theory (Beck et al., 2003); culture 
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(Stulz & Williamson, 2003); genetic distance (Ang & Kumar, 2014); social 
capital (Guiso et al., 2004), macro-finance (Rajan & Zingales, 1998; Baltagi et al., 
2009) and human capital (Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015).  
 There is another strand of the literature which is sustaining that nations 
with high ethnic diversity as less likely to develop strong financial systems owing 
to contradictory positions (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Beck et al., 2003). This 
theoretical postulation has not withstood empirical scrutiny. Ang and Kumar 
(2014) have empirically verified this theory without going at length to test the 
robustness of their results, essentially because it has not been the main line of 
inquiry motivating their study.  Moreover other recent studies by Ang (2013) on 
the one hand and Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2015) on the other hand, have not 
yielded conclusive results: with positive and negative insignificant signs 
respectively.  
 The purpose of this study is to articulate the importance of division within 
a nation. To this end, we steer clear of prior exposition by employing an indicator 
of tribalism, in place of ethnic fragmentation, while maintaining the same 
mechanisms by which tribalism affects financial development documented by 
Easterly and Levine (2003) and Beck et al. (2003). Accordingly, tribalism is a 
doctrine that consists of favouring (without reason) individuals from a given tribe 
or set of tribes. Hence, this proxy is more holistic compared to ethnic diversity. 
Mankou (2007) views tribalism as a sort of ethnic instrumentation, which entails 
according Jacobson and Deckard (2012) germs of, inter alia: rent seeking, 
corruption, inequality, ethnic diversity, indigenous population and group 
grievance.  
 In light of the above, we postulate that tribalism inhibits financial 
development. With the two axiomatic definitions in mind, it is logical to infer that 
ethnic favouritism results more from tribalism than simply ethnic diversity. Hence 
the scenario could also be qualified in terms of ethnic dominance. In other words, 
classical indicators of ethnic diversity that are employed in mainstream literature 
are limited in articulating the proxy or what they represent. Moreover, as we have 
stated earlier, the tribalism concept is of broader scope. For instance, political 
tribalism can be distinguished from monetary tribalism. The former consisting of 
an ethnocratic tendency with the aim of according tribal privileges in the 
distribution of positions that confer authority within a nation.  It gives priority or 
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exclusivity to the needs of a certain tribe or group of tribes in the distribution of 
collective resources, which have indiscriminately been accumulated by the 
collective efforts of a plethora of tribes within a nation. 
 Monetary tribalism consists of circulating money parsimoniously among 
hands, most often within a tribe or predominantly among a group of tribes. This 
allocation which is by definition sub-optimal would substantially inhibit financial 
development. It reduces innovation and essential interactions needed for financial 
system expansion. In essence, Burgess et al. (2010) and Frank and Rainer (2012) 
have shown that ethnic favouritism is detrimental to development because it 
confers a negative externality on education. Meanwhile, education positively 
affects financial development (Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015) and could break 
the boundaries of conservatism created by tribalism (Berman, 1998). Moreover, 
Eifert et al. (2010) have established that ethnic identification is important in 
political competition. Following Banerjee and Pande (2007), it is logical to infer 
that tribalism could substantially influence political leaders to engage in 
inefficient-friendly practices and adopt policies that are unfavourable to financial 
development. Berman (1998) also shows that within such a political atmosphere, 
the doctrine of tribalism leads to conservationism and creates rent seeking elites. 
Given the above, the contribution of the present study is straight forward and 
simple to follow: we assess the link between tribalism and financial development.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data 
and methodology. The empirical analysis and presentation of results are covered 
in Section 3. Robustness checks are presented in Section 4.  We conclude with 
Section 5.  
 
 
2. Empirical strategies and data 
2.1 Data 
The study investigates cross-sectional average data between 2000-2010 from 123 
countries. To measure tribalism, we use the tribalism index data from Jacobson 
and Deckard (2012). It represents a weighted aggregate of detailed components, 
ranging from a hypothetical lowest score (of 0) to the highest score (of 1).  
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Figure 1 shows that there exist substantial variations in tribalism across the world. 
The highest levels can be found primarily developing countries, with the tendency 
in Africa and the Middle East most pronounced.  
 
 
 
The dependent variable entails short-run and long-run measures of financial 
development, respectively in terms of financial intermediary development and 
stock market development. The former measurement which is consistent with 
Asongu (2013a) appreciates financial intermediary activity with private domestic 
credit and domestic credit (allocated to both to the private and public sectors of 
the economy). Following Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2015), we use stock market 
capitalization as a percentage of GDP to measure the latter. It is complemented 
with domestic credit for robustness checks. The choice of the dependents variable 
is consistent with recent stock market performance and development literature 
(Asongu, 2012a, 2013b; Ang & Kumar, 2014).  
 The choice of control variables is also motivated by recent financial 
development literature (Ang & Kumar, 2014). They include: trade openness, 
creditor rights, financial openness, legal origins (British, German, French and 
Scandinavian), tropics and latitudes. The definitions of these variables and their 
sources are provided in the appendix. Following Kodila-Tedika and Asongu 
(2015), we discuss the expected signs concurrently with the results.  
 The summary statistics is also presented in the appendix. It informs us 
that: (i) the variables are comparable from the mean values and (ii) we can be 
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confident from the standard deviations that reasonable estimated nexuses would 
emerge.  
 
2.2. Empirical specification 
 Consistent with recent financial development literature (Ang & Kumar, 
2014; Kodila-Tedika & Asongu, 2015), the specification in Eq. (1) examines the 
effect of tribalism on financial development across 123 countries.  
iiii CTribFD   321                                                                     (1) 
Where: iFD ( iTrib ) represents a financial development (Tribalism) indicator for 
country i , 1 is a constant, C  is the vector of control variables, and i  the error 
term. FD includes: private domestic credit, domestic credit and stock market 
capitalisation. Trib is the Tribalism index from Jacobson and Deckard (2012) 
while C entails: creditor rights protection, trade openness, financial openness, 
legal origins, tropics and latitude. In accordance with the underlying literature, 
the interest of Eq. (1) is to estimate if Tribalism affects financial development by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with standard errors that are consistent with 
heteroscedasticity.  
 Given that outliers may substantially affect the estimated coefficients, we 
are still consistent with the underlying literature by using Iteratively Reweighted 
Least Squares and Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) as alternative specifications. 
While the specification of the former can be adjusted from Eq. (1), we devote 
space to clarifying the LAD specification. For the purpose of simplicity, let ‘FD’ 
and ‘Trib and  C’ from Eq. (1) be y and x respectively. Such that, the  th (or 0.5th 
quantile) estimator of financial development is obtained by solving for the 
following optimization problem:  
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Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing 
the sum of squared residuals, with LAD, the weighted sum of absolute deviations 
are minimised. Hence, the LAD is the 0.50
th
 quantile (or  =0.50) which is 
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obtained by approximately weighing the residuals. The LAD of financial 
development or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                  (3) 
 
where the slope parameters are modelled for the   th specific quantile. This 
formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters 
are examined only at the mean of financial development. For the model in Eq. (3) 
the dependent variable iy  is the financial development indicator while ix  contains 
a constant term, creditor rights protection, trade openness, financial openness, 
legal origins, tropics and latitude. The LAD is increasingly employed to 
complement OLS estimations in development literature, inter alia: corruption 
(Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) and financial development 
(Asongu, 2014) studies.  
 
3. Estimation results 
This section presents the estimated results from Eq. (1). It can be noticed 
that tribalism has a negative correlation with financial development. The 
relationship is consistently significant even after the control for macroeconomic 
and institutional factors. Hence, the findings are in line with the theoretical 
underpinnings enunciated in the introduction.  
Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs. First, 
it has been established in the literature that improvement in creditor rights 
promotes financial development (Beck et al., 2013). This is principally because 
the institutional web for formal rules and informal characteristics that govern how 
creditors are treated within a nation affect the degree of financial activity within 
the underlying economy. Second, the impact of financial openness on financial 
development depends on the proxy used for the latter. In essence, it depends on 
whether the measurement is financial depth (money supply or liquid liabilities), 
financial efficiency (bank credit/bank deposits), financial size (deposit bank 
asset/total assets) or financial activity (credit). In our case, we have used private 
domestic credit because it represents credit that is actually given to private 
investors within an economy, as opposed to economic measurements capturing 
financial deposits, which may not end-up circulating due to surplus liquidity 
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issues. In light of the intuition, greater financial openness logically entails greater 
financial activity within a domestic economy. This logic is consistent with the 
sign for financial openness.  
Third, on the legal origin variables, countries with German and 
Scandinavian origins are dropped owing to issues of multicollinearity and 
overparameterization. Fourth, latitude representing the distance from the Equator 
is positively linked with financial development because countries in the North are 
relatively more developed. Fifth, given that most less developed countries are 
concentrated around the tropics, it is logical for a variable proxying for tropics to 
be negatively correlated with financial development.  
 
Table 1. OLS estimates of the impact of tribalism on financial development 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tribalism -1.543*** -1.607*** -1.644*** -1.409*** -1.247*** -1.087*** -1.270*** 
 
(0.353) (0.347) (0.375) (0.381) (0.376) (0.314) (0.322) 
crights 
 
0.113*** 0.118*** 0.096*** 0.052 0.050 0.057 
  
(0.041) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036) 
trade_open 
  
-0.091 -0.246 -0.285 -0.243 -0.149 
   
(0.188) (0.199) (0.215) (0.221) (0.211) 
fin_open 
   
0.124*** 0.159*** 0.096* 0.087 
    
(0.039) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053) 
legor_uk 
    
-0.180 0.052 0.123 
     
(0.247) (0.286) (0.278) 
legor_fr 
    
-0.359 -0.151 -0.149 
     
(0.230) (0.279) (0.274) 
legor_ge 
    
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
        
legor_sc 
    
(dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
        
lat_abst 
     
0.939*** 0.250 
      
(0.332) (0.443) 
kgatrstr 
      
-0.373* 
       
(0.201) 
Constant 1.385*** 1.233*** 1.304*** 1.121*** 1.343*** 0.873** 1.225*** 
 
(0.214) (0.215) (0.293) (0.306) (0.329) (0.378) (0.435) 
Observations  60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R² 0.308 0.369 0.372 0.429 0.470 0.534 0.561 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; Crights: creditor rights protection. trade_open: trade openness. 
fin_open: financial openness. legor_uk: United Kingdom Legal origin.  legor_fr: French Legal 
origin  legor_ge: German Legal origin.  legor_sc: Scandinavian Legal origin. lat_abst: latitude.  
Kgatrstr : tropics.  
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4. Robustness checks 
In Section 4, we perform robustness checks in a number of ways. First, by 
employing alternative specification techniques to control for outliers, notably: 
Iteratively Reweighted Least Squares (IRWLS), the procedure proposed by Hadi 
(1992) and the LAD method in Eq. (2).  Second, by employing alternative 
financial development indicators, namely: domestic credit for short-term finance 
and stock market capitalization for long-run financial development. Third, in 
order to account for additional unobserved heterogeneity, we control for other 
effects like: social trust, institutions, income levels, continents and intelligence. 
The robustness checks in the first and second is based on Column 7 of Table 1. 
For brevity and lack of space, we only report the independent variables of interest 
and the information criteria for validity of models.  
Table 2 presents results that control for outliers. The empirical approach 
follows Huber (1973) on the use of IRWLS. As has been noted by Midi and Talib 
(2008), in comparison to OLS, the procedure has the advantage of producing 
robust estimators because they simultaneously fix any concern arising from the 
presence of outliers and/or heteroskedasticity (non-constant error variances). In 
the second column, the technique of Hadi (1992) is employed to detect outliers. 
The following countries are detected and excluded from the estimation: Mali, 
Egypt, Belgium, Niger, Netherlands, Senegal, Syria, United Kingdom, 
Bangladesh, Algeria, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia and Turkey. In Column 3, the 
result with LAD is presented, with standard errors that are bootstrapped with 1000 
repetitions. The correlations between tribalism and financial development are 
consistent with those in Table 1. 
 
Table 2: Controlling from outliers  
 
IRWLS Hadi (1992) LAD 
Tribalism -1.273*** -1.651** -1.189** 
 
(0.384) (0.748) (0.569) 
Constant  1.458*** 2.029*** 1.388** 
 
(0.357) (0.564) (0.675) 
Number of observations 60 46 60 
R² 0.700 0.552 
 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; A constant and all control variables (i.e., 
creditor rights, trade openness, financial openness, trade openness x  financial 
openness, legal origins dummies and geographic variables) used in Table 1 
are included in the estimations but the results are not reported to conserve 
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space. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
 
In Table 3, we employ domestic credit and stock market capitalization as 
alternative measurements of financial development for further robustness 
purposes.  The former (latter) is a short (long)-term measurement for financial 
intermediary (stock market) development. The findings which confirm the 
direction of the underlying relationships further reveal that irrespective of the 
measurement of financial development employed, but for the lower degree of 
association with stock market capitalization, the sensitivity of tribalism is almost 
the same. This is essentially because the magnitude of the estimate corresponding 
to domestic credit is broadly consistent with those from private domestic credit in 
Table 1.   
 
Table 3. Alternative measures of financial development 
 
Domestic 
credit/GDP 
Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
Tribalism -1.551*** -0.593* 
 
(0.515) (0.304) 
Constant 1.989** 0.649** 
 
(0.828) (0.267) 
Number of observations 60 54 
R² 0.558 0.610 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; A constant and all control 
variables (i.e., creditor rights, trade openness, financial openness, 
trade openness,  financial openness, legal origins dummies, and 
geographic variables) used in Table 1 are included in the estimations 
but the results are not reported to conserve space. Figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
 
 For further robustness check purposes, we control for other effects to 
confirm the baseline results. These include: social trust, institutions, income 
levels, intelligence and regions (Africa, Europe, Asia, Americas and Oceania).  
The definitions of these variables and their corresponding sources are provided in 
the Appendix. The control for these additional indicators can broadly be 
considered as controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity not accounted for in 
baseline regressions.  
 The following findings are established. First, the fact that social trust is 
positively linked to financial development confirms the antagonistic role of 
tribalism which entails limited trust or trust confined within a certain tribe or 
groups of tribes. According to Guiso et al. (2004), nations with high levels of 
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social trust are endowed with households that invest less in cash, which have 
greater access to formal institutional credit (measured as financial activity in our 
study). Second, the positive role of institutions in financial development has been 
substantially covered in the financial development literature (Beck et al., 2003; 
Asongu, 2012b). Third, high-income is associated with higher levels in financial 
development. This is the case with advanced countries relative to their less 
developed counterparts. Fourth, the positive role of intelligence, proxied by the 
intellectual quotient (IQ), is consistent with Kodila-Tedika and Asongu (2015). 
Fifth, on continental influences, Asia is dropped due to concerns about 
multicollinearity while Oceania is not significant. Africa, Americas and Europe 
are negatively correlated with increasing magnitudes respectively.  
 
Table 4. Controlling for other effects 
 
Add Social 
trust 
Add 
Institution 
Add income 
Add 
continent 
Add  
IQ 
Tribalism -1.358*** -0.795*** -1.022*** -1.595*** -1.094*** 
 
(0.471) (0.284) (0.283) (0.389) (0.274) 
Social trust 1.452*** 
    
 
(0.496) 
    
Institution  
 
0.090*** 
   
  
(0.025) 
   
Income  
  
0.260*** 
  
   
(0.045) 
  
Africa 
   
-0.433*** 
 
    
(0.141) 
 
Europe 
   
-0.620*** 
 
    
(0.230) 
 
Asia 
   
(dropped) 
 
      
Americas 
   
-0.559** 
 
    
(0.260) 
 
Oceania 
   
0.188 
 
    
(0.192) 
 
IQ 
    
0.031*** 
     
(0.006) 
Constant 1.418*** 0.908** -0.486 1.865*** -1.225** 
 
(0.506) (0.446) (0.383) (0.394) (0.573) 
Number of observations 53 60 59 60 59 
R2 0.654 0.683 0.717 0.692 0.730 
Notes:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; A constant and all control variables (i.e., creditor rights, trade openness, 
financial openness, trade openness x  financial openness, legal origins dummies and geographic variables) 
used in Table 1 are included in the estimations but the results are not reported to conserve space. Figures in 
parentheses are robust standard errors. 
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5. Concluding implications 
We have assessed the correlations between tribalism and financial 
development in 123 countries using data averages from 2000-2010. The tribalism 
index is used to measure tribalism whereas financial development is measured 
from perspectives of financial intermediary and stock market developments.  The 
long-term indicator is stock market capitalisation while short-run variables 
include: private and domestic credits. We find that tribalism is negatively 
correlated with financial development and the magnitude of negativity is higher 
for financial intermediary development relative to stock market development. 
These findings are robust to alternative estimation techniques and control for a 
plethora of factors.  
 Tribalism could diminish financial development by limiting: (i) money 
supply, financial depth, liquid liabilities or the proportion of money circulating 
within the banking sector; (ii) bank efficiency (bank credit on bank deposits) if 
credit is restricted within certain tribal confines  and (iii) stock market 
capitalisation due to the fear of losing tribal control on businesses. 
 First, tribalism could restrict financial depth by limiting liquid liabilities 
when investors within a given tribe choose to employ informal banking 
institutions for financial transactions. In such circumstances, lending and 
borrowing are often among tribal affiliations. This substantially affects the 
amount of money circulating within formal banking establishments. Second, by 
depositing less in formal financial institutions, investors and citizens with 
tribalistic tendencies affect the quantity of deposits that can be mobilised within 
the economy and hence, the amount of credit that can be made available to 
domestic investors (private and public). Moreover, in formal financial institutions 
where credit allocation is influenced by tribal ties, tribes that are not favoured may 
be clouded with higher information asymmetry which could lead to: (i) 
discriminatory lending practices like higher interest charges and (ii) surplus 
liquidity issues.  Hence, allocation efficiency is negatively affected by tribalism. 
Third, businesses with strong family and tribal inclinations may be unwilling to 
trade their shares in stock markets for fear of losing control or according voting 
rights to other tribes. This is one of the reasons for the slow start of the Douala 
Stock Exchange (Ake & Ognaligui, 2010).  
13 
 
 The negative magnitude of tribalism on short-term financial development 
is higher than the corresponding relationship with long-run financial development 
because, it is more likely for the banking sector to be captured by tribalistic 
practices. Some justifications include: (i) stock market development is more 
globalised (or opened) relative to financial intermediary market development and 
(ii) absence of well functioning stock markets in many developing countries. 
 The findings are particularly relevant to African and Middle Eastern countries 
where the scourge is most pronounced.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Data sources and summary statistics of variables 
Table A1 
Definitions and Sources of variables. 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Privatecredit “Value of financial intermediaries credits to the private 
sector as a share of GDP (excludes credit to the public sector 
and credit issued by central and development banks), 
average over 2000–2010” 
World Bank WDI online 
database; Beck et al. (2010) 
Domesticcredit “Comprised of private credit as well as credit to the public 
sector (central and local governments and public enterprise) 
as a share of GDP, average over 2000–2010” 
World Bank WDI online 
database; Beck et al. (2010) 
Stock 
marketcapitalization 
“Value of listed companies shares on domestic exchanges as 
a share of GDP, average over 2000–2010” 
World Bank WDI online 
database; Beck et al. (2010) 
Creditorrights “An index of the protection of creditor rights in 2000. It 
reflects the ease with which creditors can secure assets in the 
event of bankruptcy. It takes on discrete values of 0 (weak 
creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor rights)” 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Trade openness “Sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a 
share of GDP in 2000” 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Financial openness “Sum of gross stock of foreign assets and liabilities as a 
share of GDP in 2000” 
Lane et al. (2007) 
LegalOrigins “Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a country’s 
legal system is of French, German or Scandinavian Civil 
Law origin and zero otherwise” 
La Porta et al. (2008) 
Latitude “Absolute value of the latitude of a country, scaled between 
zero and one, where zero is for the location of the equator 
and one is for the poles” 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Tropics “The percentage of land area classified as tropical and 
subtropical based on the Koeppen-Geiger system” 
Gallup et al. (1999) 
Religion variables “A set of three variables that identifies the percentage of a 
country’s population in the 1980s that follows Catholic, 
Muslim and Other religion” 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
EthnicFractionalization “An index of ethnic fractionalization, constructed as one 
minus the Herfindahl index of the share of the largest ethnic 
groups. It reflects the probability that two individuals, 
selected at random from a country’s population, will belong 
to different ethnic groups. The index ranges from 0 to 1 
where the higher the value the greater the fractionalization in 
a country” 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
InstitutionalQuality “An overall indicator of institutional quality measured as the 
sum of the six sub-indices for 2000 from World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WBGI): voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. Countries with higher values on this index have 
institutions of greater quality” 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
Social Capital “Data on trust between individuals in a given country. 
Measured by taking the percentage of a population that 
answers ‘Yes’ to the World Value Survey (WVS) question 
‘In general, do you think that most people can be trusted?’, 
supplemented by data from the Danish Social Capital 
Project, the Latinobarometro and the Afrobarometer” 
Bjørnskov (2008) 
Intelligence 
Average of IQ Meisenberg and Lynn 
(2011) 
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Table A2. 
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Private credit 180 0.504 0.463 0.019 2.303 
Tribalism  60 0.539 0.1886 0.2 0.995 
Creditor rights 216 1.826 0.935 0 4 
Trade openness 180 0.883 0.509 0.010 3.720 
Financial openness 177 2.156 2.521 0.424 23.977 
Latitude 208 0.283 0.189 0.0110 0.8 
Tropics 165 0.374 0.436 0 1 
Catholic 207 0.320 0.360 0 0.991 
Muslim  207 0.219 0.353 0 0.999 
Protestant  205 0.145 0.233 0 0.998 
Domestic credit 180 0.596 0.544 -0.297 3.111 
Stock market capitalization 124 0.494 0.584 0 4.238 
Ethnic Fractionalization 188 0 .440 0.258 0 0.930 
Institutional Quality 189 2.338 3.782 -6.654 9.419 
Social Capital 111 0.262 0.140 0.034 0.654 
Income 180 8.528 1.304 5.561 11.142 
 
 
 
